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In January and again in November 2015 France was confronted with a series of co-
ordinated terrorist attacks in Paris. These ‘events’ shocked France (and the world)
and were presented by actors and observers as turning points. Yet, as all signifi-
cant events, they give rise to a plurality of interpretations. We argue that the strat-
egy developed by the French government is a good example of how contempo-
rary politics mobilises the symbolic, a dimension of public policy that is often
neglected. Using interviews with key advisors of the President and the Prime
Minister and analyses of official speeches and performances in the first weeks af-
ter the attacks, we show how the government endeavoured to impose its framing
of the attacks through rhetoric, symbols and performance in order to coproduce
the ‘events’ as moments in which it acted decisively to unite the Nation.
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In January and again in November 2015 France was confronted with a series of
coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris. The first occurred at the headquarters of
a satirical newspaper (Charlie Hebdo) and in a kosher supermarket; the second in
a stadium, on the terraces of cafe´s and restaurants in the heart of the city and in a
concert hall (Le Bataclan). They left, respectively, 17 and 130 people dead and, in
the case of November, hundreds of wounded. The initial violence and the subse-
quent hunts for the perpetrators were carried on under intense media scrutiny
and France plunged into a state of shock. They mobilised millions of people in
the streets (culminating in the 11 January marches) and online (for instance,
through the slogan ‘Je suis Charlie’ that spread through the world in the hours
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following the first attack). The nature, the extent and the social significance of
such mobilisations has been intensely discussed (Courtois et al., 2015; Fourquet
and Mergier, 2015; Todd and Laforgue, 2015; Valls, 2015; Mayer and Tiberj,
2016). The attacks and reactions to them received exceptional media coverage at
the time1 and led to intense editorial activities in the months that followed: an
impressive array of think tank analyses, books, documentaries and even graphic
novels have been published since January 2015. Twitter proclaimed them its
‘events of the year’ in 2015.2 Opinion polls revealed a surge of support for the ex-
ecutive’s effort to unite the country and respond to the attacks. Yet, no study has
thus far focussed on this effort and how it was conceived and built by the French
government.
At the time the two series of events were met with quite different interpreta-
tions of national unity. This is in no way surprising (Nora, 1974; Farge, 2002;
Berezin, 2012), particularly if one takes into account the brutality with which
they punctured the taken-for-granted nature of peaceful context. They created a
‘critical juncture’ (Mahoney, 2001, p. 114; Pierson, 2004, p. 135) or a comprehen-
sibility break, defining a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ (Bensa and Fassin, 2002, p. 9). Yet,
the complexity of an event might lead us to underestimate the role some actors
play in defining it as a turning point. In times of crisis, governments are expected
to provide some guidance as to how reality ought to be understood. Their role in
the production of such meanings is all the more important as the everyday con-
sensus on what it means to live together—that is normally maintained through
routine interactions—is suspended or challenged. Indeed, at such times, govern-
ments offer one of the first interpretations of what is happening and do so in part
because they are seen as one of the few sources of reliable information (Baum and
Groeling, 2010). Their readings of the situation are expressed through speech acts
and practical decisions: these interpretations contribute to shape others’ under-
standings and reactions.
We contend that these events offer excellent opportunities to analyse how a
small group of key-actors, at the head of the French State, has contributed to
shape the interpretation of the terrorist attacks. Through rhetoric and symbolic
performance, the executive (President Hollande, Prime Minister Valls, Minister
of the Interior Cazeneuve) played an active role in building what can be seen as a
rally phenomenon combining public opinion support and the (always relative)
suspension of criticism from the media and the Opposition. The objective of this
1 They registered at the highest levels of ‘media noise’, accessed at http://www.siglab.fr/fr/lannee-media
tique-edition-2016 on 24 April 2017. See also Lefe´bure and Se´cail (2016).
2Twitter France counted the number of keywords and ‘retweets’ they contributed to generate (http://
www.europe1.fr/medias-tele/les-attentats-evenements-de-lannee-2015-sur-twitter-france-2632253,
accessed 21 March 2016).
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article is to analyse the efforts deployed by the French government to control the
definition of the situation (in a context in which they manifestly had lost such
control), in interaction with the media, with political elites and with what they
perceived of the public’s reactions. We focus on the government’s communica-
tion strategy and performance during the first couple of weeks after the attacks
and analyse the events of January and November together because they offer in-
teresting contrasts and similarities. These attacks were not the only terrorist inci-
dents in France during that period but both were identified as acute crises both
because of the sheer number and the particular qualities of the victims
(Chowanietz, 2016, p. 162).
We start this article with a review of the literatures on the rallying of peoples
around the flag, crises management and frame analysis, in order to situate our ar-
gument. Then, after the presentation of our data sources and methodology, we
show that the government aimed to assert its control over the situation as well as
the impression that it was in control through performances and the manipulation
of symbols. We then turn to the rhetorical framings ‘deployed’ and argue that
these interpretations were tightly articulated with justifications for the chosen
courses of action and a concern for social and political unity. In the last two sec-
tions, we analyse how the French government worked to produce a ‘rally around
the flag’ through its engagement with the Opposition, the media and public opin-
ion, arguing that this was achieved more successfully in January than in
November. In the conclusion, we return to the symbolic dimension of policy in
times of crisis.
1. Literature review
It is sometimes taken for granted that terrorist attacks strengthen the popularity
of the government. As a consequence, a variety of responses are sometimes seen
to constitute a tendency for a ‘rallying around the flag’ prompted by the promo-
tion of a ‘patriotic reflex’ (Mueller, 1985). This has given rise to a huge literature.
Collins, for instance, analyses how, in the aftermath of the attacks on 11
September 2001 (thereafter 9/11), the displaying of the flag could be read as a rit-
ual of solidarity and gave rise to shifts in social identification and social pressure
(Collins, 2004); Brody on the other hand distinguishes elite and public opinion,
and the media. He argues that they influence each other and that, in the absence
of alternative sources of information from the government, support for the exec-
utive was easier to achieve (Brody, 1991). Hetherington and Nelson analyse
swings in public support for the executive and proposed that the suspension of
criticism from the opposition could come from them taking cues from their in-
terpretation of the public mood (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). Baker and
Oneal highlight the role of the President’s handling of the situation (Baker and
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Oneal, 2001) and his ability to use his position to direct media attention and
therefore provide cues to the public. Chowanietz offers a rare comparative study
of rallying effects, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on the reactions of
parliamentary opposition (Chowanietz, 2016). In January 2015 for instance, the
popularity of both the President and his Prime Minister (PM) received a consid-
erable boost—if temporary and probably all the stronger as the initial level was
low.3 The government also obtained the support of parliamentary parties (includ-
ing radical parties, particularly in January) and religious leaders. Support for the
government was also impressive after the second attack, in November, although
the repetition opened a particular vulnerability for the government and questions
were asked about how effective its response had been.
Indeed, overall, the literature shows that rallying around the flag—or broad
support for the executive, is by no means guaranteed. Mueller (1985), for in-
stance, has shown that only ‘specific, dramatic and sharply focused international
events’ are likely to have an impact on the popularity of the American President.
Moreover, he did not distinguish the different groups that might rally behind the
executive. The more recent literature points to a number of factors that contrib-
ute (or not) to the rallying of the Opposition parties around the incumbent gov-
ernment: the magnitude of the attack (i.e. the number of victims) and the origin
of the attack (domestic or international); the nature of the target (anonymous
commuters, the State, the press) and the nature of the government (Presidential
or Parliamentary systems); the repetition of attacks; the political orientation of
the incumbent government4; and the electoral calendar (Baum, 2002, 2013;
Williams, Koch and Smith, 2013; Chowanietz, 2016). The comparison between
January and November 2015 is a good way to illustrate such phenomenon of ral-
lying or resistance from the Opposition parties.
This is congruent with the literature on crises management, which points to
the importance of effective communication strategies throughout a given crisis.
However, governments do not merely offer solutions to ‘objective’ social prob-
lems: they seize issues, construct them as problems requiring political interven-
tion and propose what they claim to be appropriate political responses (Edelman,
3See Baker and Oneal (2001). The boost benefited the Prime Minister more than the President and
was stronger after January than November. See the Cevipof panel study (wave 7 conducted in
February 2016, accessed at http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevi
pof/resultats-1/vague7/ on 24 April 2017).
4Right-wing governments are more likely to benefit from rally after a terrorist attack (Chowanietz,
2016, pp. 88–89). More generally, since the 1990s, the governmental left has sought to assert its creden-
tials in terms of security (Faucher-King and Le Gale`s, 2010, pp. 124–130). Following Tony Blair’s ex-
ample, Manuel Valls has constructed his political persona on the issue of security.
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1985). The symbolic dimension of public policy is often overlooked, sometimes
reduced to communication or to measures with little or no impact on the issue at
stake, although most (if not all) public policies involve either using existing social
categories or creating new ones, such as the definition of victims or of targets of
action (Soss and Schram, 2007) or the justification for policy instruments or of a
framework for policy intervention (Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, 1980; Stone, 1989;
Radaelli, 2000). Governments are expected to maintain the public order and,
in time of crisis, to (re)create order. They do so through the manipulation of im-
ages, symbols and rituals (’tHart, 1993, p. 36). One of the core tasks of crisis man-
agement revolves around giving meaning to what is going on. Policymakers give
interpretations of the event at each stage: they describe the event, identify the vic-
tims, point to the causes, label the problem and offer solutions, which they then
implement and evaluate. All these meaning-making activities are developed in re-
lation to the expectations of the other stakeholders, such as public opinion
and the media. Boin et al. (2011) convincingly argue that effective crisis commu-
nication makes a crucial difference between getting or losing ‘the permissive con-
sensus’ (p. 70) because the ‘selective exploitation of data, arguments and
historical analogies’ contribute to shape public representations and facilitate
the formation of coalitions (p. 82). Our work speaks directly to this kind
of theme.
Yet, governments are not the only social actors to engage in framing activities,
that is to say in a ‘process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously,
act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be
interpreted by others in a particular manner’ (Kuypers, 2006, p. 8). Scholars of
social movements who have analysed the cognitive work performed by move-
ments (Benford and Snow, 2000) show how such movements articulate a social
fact as a political issue and propose an interpretation of its causes and its potential
remedies through images, stories, language and emotions. Movements attempt to
influence the frames of interpretation used by the public in order to make sense
of an event (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). Indeed, research confirms that
public opinion can be influenced by the ways in which a variety of social actors,
movements, institutions, politicians and the media talk about an issue (Chong
and Druckman, 2007). Thus, the literature on social movements can also help
us to understand the potential impact of the executive’s framing of the events
on the public sphere and the population. Kuypers (2006), for instance,
discusses how President G.W. Bush’s interpretations of 9/11 served as a justifica-
tion for war and influenced the media, elite and public opinion reactions in the
following weeks and months. Our aim here is to reproduce this kind of analysis
concerning the French government’s responses to the 2015 terrorist attacks
in Paris.
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2. Data and methodology
Thus, when analysing public reactions to terrorist attacks, it is important to gauge
how the government contributed to shape the public’s reactions, whether it made
it more difficult for the Opposition and the media to be critical, merely encour-
aged a ‘patriotic reflex’ or helped the emergence of a consensus that legitimised
its handling of a crisis it had failed to prevent.
Our study draws from a series of interviews conducted in three waves in 2015,
2016 and 2017. In March 2015, we gained access to the office of the PM in
Matignon where we interviewed close advisors to and senior civil servants of
Manuel Valls (5). These preliminary contacts led us to secure further interviews
at the Elyse´e Palace with several members of President Hollande’s staff (3), and at
Hotel Beauvau (Interior Minister’s Michel Cazeneuve’s office). We also inter-
viewed members of the Paris Mayor’s office (2). We attended seminars and inter-
viewed staff at the Government Information Services (3). Finally, we interviewed
several political actors involved in the organisation of the March or in the politi-
cal reactions (4). We conducted a further five interviews in May and June 2016
and one in February 2017, including repeat interviews. These interviews provided
precious information about decision-making processes. In 2015, we asked people
to recall what they had done, what their specific role involved and how it differed
from the routine of government. In 2016, in addition to these questions, they
were asked about the differences between the two sequences (January and
November). Triangulation of information was important because their precise
memories of the chronology of events and decisions during the period were
sometimes imprecise (Davies, 2001). Moreover, as each of our respondents was
involved in a different role and task, they brought different perspectives on the
management of the crisis and on the workings of government: some liaised with
the victims and their families, some provided notes on ceremonial practices or as-
sessed variations in the public’s moods, some coordinated the flow of informa-
tion during the operations of the police services, some talked to the media or
coordinated the Republican march or the mini international gathering, and so
forth. But they were also in relation to each other and participated in the same
meetings, which enabled us to triangulate their responses.
We met all the interviewees in their offices and recorded our conversations.
However, due to the sensitivity of the material and the timing of our study (inter-
views were conducted a few weeks after the events), we assured the President’s,
PM’s and Interior Minister’s staffs that their comments would not be directly at-
tributed (Peabody et al., 1990). Although this has helped gathering original data,
it makes using direct quotes while preserving anonymity a challenge (Rhodes,
2011, pp. 8–11). President Hollande’s Communication advisor, whom we met
three times, is an exception to this rule. In the text, we use quotation marks
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whenever we draw directly from interview material and, where possible or appro-
priate, we indicate whether the interviewee is speaking from the Elyse´e, Matignon
or otherwise (Interior Ministry; Government’s information services or SIG, polit-
ical party).
We also collected and analysed primary sources such as the speeches and dec-
larations made by the President, the PM and the Interior Minister; their respec-
tive official schedule; press releases from the Conseil des ministres, the President’s,
PM’s and Interior Minister’s offices and the National Assembly.5 We consulted
audio-visual documents including those of public ceremonies and public perfor-
mances, accessible directly through the governmental websites, through video
websites and archives. We collected articles published in the daily and weekly
press. We had access to a number of surveys and reports, published (or not) dur-
ing this period, relating to public opinion reactions to the tragic events, to post-
electoral surveys or to governmental initiatives, or to tolerance.6 In these docu-
ments, we searched for narratives and key words, giving special attention to the
use of metaphors, symbols and symbolic practices.
We concentrate here on how the government constructed the attacks as events
during the first couple of weeks.
3. Political communication as symbolic action
Framing is usually reduced to its rhetorical dimension but we argue that one
should also take into account symbolic practices. In fact, public authorities
claimed on a number of occasions that their actions used symbols (of national
unity, of national identity or of their regalian powers, for instance) and involved
symbolic work. Communication is an essential dimension of any successful gov-
ernmental strategy, as anthropologists have repeatedly shown. The senior civil
servants we spoke to nevertheless point to recent changes and consider that ‘feed-
ing the beast’ has become more relentless and that there is a new appetite for
transparency. ‘Things will get known anyway’ concurred the chiefs of staff we in-
terviewed and the President’s communication advisor. This context explains not
only the decision of the former to communicate on failed attacks, but also the lat-
ter’s choice to provide access and images to fill the media space available rather
5 These are available on the sites of these institutions: http://www.elysee.fr, http://www.gouvernement.
fr and accessed at http://www.interieur.gouv.fr on 24 April 2017. We quote the speeches by providing
their date, title and location.
6The Service d’information du gouvernent receives all published polls focusing on the action of the gov-
ernment. Dynamob was conducted in early December 2015 (accessed at http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/
recherche-dynamob/page-d-exemple/ on 24 April 2017). The CNCDH publishes an annual report
(Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits de l’Homme, 2016).
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than risk it being filled by political adversaries and critics. Communication was
planned to underline the importance given by the government to the unfolding
events.
The actions of the French President are largely constrained by protocol and
routines. These contributed to give the President’s words a solemn dimension
that had been somehow lost during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. Franc¸ois
Hollande initially defined himself in opposition to his predecessor’s hyper activity
and visibility (De Maillard, Surel, 2012; Gaffney, 2015). This changed after
January 2015: the President intervened more frequently in the media through for-
mal speeches and interviews; there were also more clips of performance of official
duty or interactions with journalists and documentaries about life at Elyse´e
Palace.
Presidential trips are usually planned a long time in advance but visits to the
location of catastrophes are considered as a symbolic imperative of crisis manage-
ment in a media age (Boin, et al. 2011, p. 85). They give a particular light to the
place visited, they focus attention and they indicate the intensification of govern-
mental efforts and the support of the President.7 In both cases, the President
went to the scene to assess the situation, before the buildings had been secured by
the Police and Security Services. Hollande met impromptu with journalists out-
side the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January; he also visited the Bataclan to talk to
survivors and emergency services in the middle of the night in November. Each
time, he expressed ‘France’s infinite emotion in the context of the drama and
tragedy’ (14 November).
In fact, every presidential decision or move is a form of institutional commu-
nication.8 As a consequence, whether they are planned or not, they all can be seen
as meaningful (Mariot, 2007) and interpreted. Governments, after all, now have
communication experts whose job is to spin or interpret for the media the mes-
sage to be read. The President’s communication advisor insisted: ‘It was very
strong, the fact that he went, it gives a national and even international dimension
to the event; (. . .) it is also reassuring for people, because the President is physi-
cally there.’ As such it can be spun as symbolically significant, while preserving
the agency of the political actor performing the role: our interviewees at the
Elyse´e and at Matignon all emphasised the ‘spontaneity’ of the decision.
The presidential team decided that it was important ‘not to get stuck in the
Elyse´e’ and to project the image of a government in action. The President’s ac-
tions and decisions were staged to underline their significance: the ‘President
7This is not unique to France: G.W. Bush was criticised for flying over New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina rather than land and visit the victims.
8This is true in France as it is in the USA (Kuypers, 2006, p. 3).
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decided to go to the bedside of the victims at the Hospital to bear witness and to
show empathy’; he ‘called the government and the Defence council to show im-
mediately how the government was responding to protect and to seek the perpe-
trators’; ‘he hardly slept and we made sure people knew about it’. The
presidential schedule was altered: non-emergency engagements were cancelled,
foreign trips postponed or organised at short notice. President Hollande was due
to meet Chancellor Merkel in Strasbourg on 11 January. As the hostage situation
in Vincennes was resolved (9 January 2015), the Chancellor offered to come to
Paris instead (and she was followed by many other foreign representatives). In
November, Hollande cancelled his participation at the G20 summit in Turkey
(sending his Foreign Minister in his stead). In the following weeks, he received
European PMs in Paris and also travelled to Washington DC and Moscow. Some
meetings were maintained because they could be read as symbolically significant,
as was the case with the New Year’s reception of the religious leaders at Elyse´e
Palace on 7 January.
An impressive number of photo opportunities were scheduled: meeting rooms
were open to photographs, such as the two ‘situation rooms’ at the Interior
Ministry or where the Defence council met at the Elyse´e Palace, so that the gov-
ernment could be seen working to solve the crisis. In print, broadcast and online
media as well as on governmental websites, President Hollande could be seen wel-
coming visitors on the steps of the Elyse´e Palace (particularly on 8 and 9 January
or on 15 November), sitting down with advisors and ministers, attending meet-
ings and talking with foreign Heads of State and government (11 January; in
November he visited the Bataclan with foreign guests and received them at the
Elyse´e Palace).
Irrespective of the ways in which the public interprets these symbolic acts, it is
worth noting that they are presented as inherently meaningful: thus, for instance
and referring to January, Hollande’s communication advisor suggests that the
work on schedule and presentation was intended to give an ‘impression of free-
dom of movement during these five days [which] contributed to create a sense of
unity’. The government routinely uses verbal and non-verbal symbols to grant
more authority to its pronouncements. Solemnity and rituals are ‘part of the
magic of the Republic’ contends the Elyse´e Communication advisor. They were
consciously, as well as routinely and unreflectively, used in 2015. Indeed, whether
the President speaks from the Elyse´e Palace, at homage ceremonies or on an offi-
cial visit, whether he delivers a long or an impromptu speech or interacts with
journalists, settings are important: opulent period furniture in the background
(‘les ors de la Re´publique’), the courtyard of the Elyse´e Palace with Republican
Guards or the flags all symbolically emphasise that the President ‘does not speak
as a person but as a symbol of the people who elected him by universal suffrage’.
Observing the public performances of the President during the weeks that
The Politics of Symbols 177
followed both events, one can see how his demeanour and his engagements car-
ried messages about the situation, as the elected representative of the French peo-
ple and as the Head of State. At ceremonies and at site visits, he stood, sombre
and often silent, to demonstrate the resilience of the Nation against adversity, its
compassion towards the victims and their families, and its gratitude to police offi-
cers and emergency staff.
In January, the President was seen rather than heard. He delivered short state-
ments on 7 and 9 January at the end of the two police raids; he gave a short
eulogy at the ceremony for the three police officers in the Pre´fecture’s courtyard
(13 January 2015). Attention was paid to content as well as delivery to impart
particular impressions on audiences. On the evening of 7 January, for instance,
the objective was to allow for the more ‘spontaneous expression of emotion and
of compassion’ and ‘the drama of the situation’ (Elyse´e interview). These two
‘adresses a la Nation’ (7 and 9 January) were ‘voluntarily unscripted’,
‘unrehearsed’. They were delivered from the Elyse´e Palace ‘in a very simple, very
direct style’. At a time when political communication is seen as overly scripted
and contrived, great effort was made to produce an impression of authenticity
and to limit accusations of partisan spin. The intention was to maintain the im-
pression of the genuine character of the performance, an impression so fragile
that it can disintegrate at any point (Goffman, 1979, p. 59). The idea here is not
that emotions were fake, but that conveying them appropriately is very difficult
and that the injunction ‘be spontaneous’ is hard to fulfil. These televised messages
were among the most watched presidential televised speeches ever: on 7 January,
21 million people watched Hollande deliver a short message in France alone. The
figure was interpreted as a sign that the country was looking up to the Elyse´e for
republican leadership. Emergency communication to provide information and
also show the rapid response of the State was also used in November. Hollande
spoke briefly on 13 November, while the raid on the music venue was still on-
going; and again on 18 November after the police intervention against the terror-
ists’ hiding place in St Denis.
Decisions were taken by the President who held innumerable meetings at the
Elyse´e Palace (Presidency), but there was a clear division of labour in January be-
tween the President and the other two key figureheads in terms of communica-
tions. Usually seen silent behind the President (as at the offices of Charlie Hebdo,
at the Bataclan, at various ceremonies, etc.), the PM and the Interior Minister ex-
pressed themselves in formal (Assemble´e nationale or Se´nat, outside the Elyse´e
Palace, Matignon Hotel (PM’s offices) or Beauvau Hotel (Interior Ministry)) and
informal settings. In particular, they toured the high-impact radio and TV sta-
tions and major news programmes (TF1, Europe 1, France Inter, BFM, etc.), they
tweeted a lot and were highly visible on the social media. They offered official and
informal statements and were widely interviewed on location. The Constitution
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of the Fifth Republic prevents the President from going to the Chambers of
Parliament (Palais Bourbon et Palais du Luxembourg). Thus, the major policy
speeches were delivered, respectively, by PM Valls (to the Assemble´e Nationale)
and Interior Minister Cazeneuve (to the Senate) on 13 January. As a notable
change with January, the President found in November several opportunities to
give lengthy speeches. Following a suggestion from the PM, the President con-
vened the Parliament in Congress (16 November). This was widely interpreted as
a deeply symbolic gesture showing political unity. Indeed, the Congress, which
brings together both Chambers to the Versailles Palace, has met only 16 times
since 1958, to revise the Constitution, to ratify EU enlargements, and twice to al-
low the President to address the representatives of the Nation (in 2009 and in
2015). Moreover, he addressed the French Mayors’ conference (18 November),
gave award at the Chirac Foundation and, last but not least, presided the homage
ceremony at Les Invalides (27 November).
Symbolic practices (including the presidential and parliamentary pomp) have
been used by the government to signal the national and international importance
of the two events and to signal how seriously it focused its attention on resolving
the crises. They served to reinforce claims to legitimacy as well as to credibility of
the government’s frames and actions.
4. The government’s rhetorical framing of the 2015 terrorist attacks
We now turn to the rhetorical frames the government deployed in January and
November to describe and explain the events, the Nation’s and the executive’s re-
sponses. These frames were composed with three other important actors in mind:
the opposition, public opinion and the press.
We focus on the initial period, the first few days or weeks. Despite the acceler-
ation of the news cycle and the reactions of other political actors, the government
usually retains an advantage as it attempts to establish its definition of the events
and their consequences. Such a privilege is due to the fact that it communicates
at a time when others are still silent (Bensa and Fassin, 2002, p. 11; Groeling and
Baum, 2008) or cautious. Indeed, in both January and November, the highest au-
thorities (President, PM and Interior minister) rushed to location to assess the
situation and comment informally before rivals and commentators could do so.
The President named the targets, the victims and labelled the perpetrators in his
early messages to the nation (7 and 9 January and then again in 13 and 18
November). The interpretations and the frames were refined in the following
days. Although being the first to define the event allows the government a degree
of latitude in the choice of frames it privileges, this is not a choice devoid of con-
straints: at minimum the interpretations have to be credible and to resonate with
The Politics of Symbols 179
the public mood as well as expectations (Kuypers, 2006, p. 5). Failing to do so
could create embarrassment or backfire.9
For a short period of time during a crisis, the government remains the only
source of reliable information:10 it speaks with authority (partly comforted in its
position by the staging discussed above) and with better knowledge than anyone
else, be it the opposition or the media. Thus, during an initial period, the ‘elastic-
ity of reality’ plays in the interest of the government (Baum and Groeling, 2010).
The duration of this liminal period during which reality is ‘elastic’ varies and it
has shrunk with the speed of news and the ability of the Internet and broadcast
media to connect with social networks, to use amateur videos, etc. Despite this
advantage, the government has to work relentlessly to dominate the mass and so-
cial media. The latter have become particularly important as a source of alterna-
tive information for the government as well as for the public: the social media
spread news and rumours. In recent years, the government uses it to gauge public
moods and respond to them. Far from merely relaying official speeches, television
played in January a highly unusual role, relaying rumours picked up on social
media, sending camera crews on location as soon as they got whiff that something
might be happening. News channels were on ‘breaking news’ coverage for 3 days.
At both the Elyse´e Palace and the Matignon Hotel, the cabinets (the chief of staff
and close advisors) followed events on their screens as much as through commu-
nication with the teams on the ground until the simultaneous assaults on the two
sites (where the terrorists were entrenched). A member of the PM’s team ex-
plained: ‘We were following events on TV in my office then at some point I no-
ticed that there were no new images and the PMs told me that the raid had
started.’ Broadcasters, who had sent cameras to the sites, were ordered to intro-
duce a 30-minute delay in their live feeds because the government was concerned
that terrorists would be able to anticipate the police raids through watching TV.
Having been reprimanded in January for endangering the public (and particu-
larly the hostages at the kosher supermarket), the media focused their attention
in November on the victims and on the emergency support services (contributing
to reinforce the trauma of the event).
It is important to remember that the government prepares its communication
with an eye on the constant flux of public opinion, gathered through qualitative
and quantitative studies conducted on a daily basis, online and offline, and
9This is true whether or not these governmental interpretations are taken up or on the contrary
challenged. In contrast with 2015, the government appeared to rush a terrorist frame in the few hours
following the 14 July 2016 killings in Nice.
10In 2004, the incumbent Spanish government quickly accused Basque terrorists of the Madrid bomb-
ings only to be proven wrong a few hours later, undermining its trustworthiness within a few days of
general elections (Bali, 2007; Montalvo, 2012).
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through the analysis of the messages and letters received by the President’s office.
The government needs to be in sync with public opinion because if the govern-
ment fails to get its message across, others will. So, the government’s reactions to
the events in January and November were different in their tone not only because
the two terrorist attacks differed in their targets, in their magnitude or in the ori-
gins of the perpetrators, but also because they were calibrated to the perceived ex-
pectations and moods of the public (characterised by a will to gather in January
yet by more of a will to retaliate in November).
To help the dissemination of their frame the executive trio, composed of the
President, the PM and the Interior Minister, maximised their exposure in the
mass and social media. They proposed a diagnostic of the problem (the symp-
toms and its causes) and a course of action to remedy it (Benford and Snow,
2000). As the enquiries progressed, the frames proposed by the government were
tuned to the parameters of the event, including the perceived public mood. Set
phrases were worked on in the following days so that the government could be
‘on message’. The frame was then recycled from speeches to interviews and circu-
lated widely in the media. It defined the situation at the same time as it articu-
lated (and thereby attempted to legitimise) responses. It was Manichean and
simple, and also encapsulated the familiar naming, blaming, claiming pattern
(Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, 1980).
The President announced that France was facing ‘cowardice’ (twice), ‘obscu-
rantism’, ‘barbarism’, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘infamy’ perpetrated by ‘assassins’ (7
January 15). In November, the President’s first short statement expressed ‘hor-
ror’. Following a framework similar to the one adopted in January, he contrasted
‘terrorists’ and ‘criminals’ spreading ‘terror’.
Defining the attacks as domestic or international plays an important part in
the framing process and contributes to shape the governmental actions as well as
the public’s reactions. Although the terrorists at Charlie Hebdo had claimed (and
had been filmed) to be acting in the name of an international cause, framing
them as international terrorists was not straightforward and initially rejected by
the President: the terrorists were ‘crazy fanatics, who have nothing to do with
Islam’ (Hollande, 9 January). Their social and education backgrounds exposed
the failings of the French integration model. On the contrary, the November at-
tacks had been carefully ‘planned abroad – in Syria and Belgium – and carried
with French accomplices’.11 They relied on external support and coordination.
Although some of the perpetrators were French, the magnitude of the organisa-
tion involved and the death tolls were on different scales.
Chowanietz argues that political responses to acts of terrorism are starker
when the State itself is targeted (Chowanietz, 2016, p. 157). His analysis is
11Valls, Assemble´e nationale, 19 November 2015.
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confirmed by our interviewees in the Elyse´e Palace and at Matignon Hotel. In
January, the victims of the attacks were immediately seen as being symbolically
charged. The satirical journal had not been picked by chance: it had received
many death threats (particularly since the publication of the Danish cartoons of
Mohammed) and the editor was under police protection. According to interview
respondents at Matignon and the Elyse´e palace, the framing proposed by the gov-
ernment ‘presented itself’, it merely ‘unveiled what was implicit’. Speaking to
journalists in front of the police station where the policeman killed in front of
Charlie Hebdo’s offices worked, the PM said ‘they wanted to attack France to its
heart, they assassinated journalists and police staff’ (7 January 2015). The
President was explicit in naming the symbolic targets attacked by the terrorists:
‘Today, the Republic was attacked. The Republic is freedom of speech. The
Republic is culture, it is creation, it is pluralism and it is democracy. This is what
the assassins were aiming at. It is the ideal of justice and peace that France carries
everywhere on the international scene’.12 As events unfolded, the framing by the
government evolved. The next day a policewoman was shot in an apparently ran-
dom incident (she was attending to a traffic incident). The symbolic meaning of
the killing only emerged for the government when the connection was made with
the attack on the kosher supermarket, the following day. It was immediately qual-
ified as a ‘horrifying anti-Semitic act’. Whether or not the assassin indeed shot
the policewoman because she wore a uniform, this interpretation was neverthe-
less proposed by the government. In later speeches, the State (three police officers
killed) and the Nation (the Jewish community as part of the national commu-
nity) were also identified as targets. Despite the shock, however, the executive
also insisted that France was ‘great’ and ‘strong’ and remained ‘a Nation who
knows how to defend itself’, strengthened by its values (liberty was repeated five
times), its ‘democracy’ and its ‘heroes’ (Hollande, 9 January).
We can trace the similar use of categories and arguments in November. In
Versailles, the President described the attack as ‘an aggression against our coun-
try, its values, its youth, its lifestyle’; again, the ‘cowardly assassins’ and ‘despica-
ble killers’ were opposed to the ‘passionate, valiant and brave French people’. He
clarified that the target was ‘France’, a France that ‘loves life, culture, sport, party-
ing, a France without distinction of colour, origin, path or religion. The France
the assassins wanted to kill was the youth, in its diversity (. . .) a France opened to
the world.’ A few days later, the PM made the same argument to the Assemble´e
Nationale: ‘On Friday, terrorists did not randomly choose their targets. They hit
the youth, full of life, aspiring to emancipation through knowledge, its taste for
difference, culture, music, a curiosity about the Other. Let us not be mistaken:
12Accessed at <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-a-la-suite-de-l-attentat-au-siege-
de-charlie-hebdo/>. on 30 March 2017
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terrorism has hit France not for what it does – in Iraq, Syria or in the Sahel – but
for what it is.’13
A recurring theme follows from the identification of France as the victim: the
need to preserve its strength and cohesion. In the very short message of 7
January, ‘unity’ was repeated twice and presented the best ‘weapon’ against ter-
rorism. The second half of the message drew from this very lexicon: ‘solidarity’,
‘fraternity’, ‘nothing can divide us, nothing must oppose us, nothing must sepa-
rate us’. President Hollande announced he would ‘bring together’ the people,
propose a ‘common’ response, so that the country could ‘stand as one’ (faire
bloc). ‘Gathering’ and ‘let’s gather’ were both repeated twice. Such a focus on
unity responded to concerns about inter-community violence that were taken
very seriously. The government had received reports about possible backlash
against the French Muslim community and was concerned about the prospect of
civil conflicts. As a consequence, there was a particular emphasis on distinguish-
ing Islam from the ideology of the terrorists14 and showing the support of reli-
gious leaders. At the same time, however, the public mood expressed in letters
and emails to the President spoke of a ‘call to republican values as a means to re-
spond to the attack and defend the community’. ‘Two things really struck us im-
mediately’, an Elyse´e advisor told us, ‘the spontaneous demonstrations and the
audience of the televised speech on the Wednesday. It was not innocent. The
Nation was united. It needed no-one to happen. In reality it is sometimes enough
to name things, to give words to name what is already happening’. This contrib-
utes to explain the decision to focus energy on staging a large demonstration of
national unity (to which we return below) and a self-legitimating satisfaction
with the outcome. The President’s communication advisor considers that there is
no other means of evaluating how effective the strategy was but to consider the
counterfactual: ‘there could have been street fights, (. . .) there were none. There
were a few incidents but nothing dramatic. There could have been hate between
social groups. It was not the case because there was this will to appease; to unite
and not stigmatise anyone.’
The dominant trope in November was quite different. The PM alone had
mentioned war in his 13 January speech to the Assemble´e Nationale—at a time
when the President insisted on unity. During the summer, his office commis-
sioned a report to prepare the response in case of another major attack (Dive,
2016). The government indeed expected that intelligence or luck would fail to
13Prime Minister’s speech on a government’s bill proposing the extension of the state of emergency for
another three months, 19 November 2015.
14Interestingly, surveys show that a long-term trend of improving degrees of tolerance towards all mi-
norities has not been disrupted by 2015 events (Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits de
l’Homme, 2016, p. 289). The same study, however, highlights increased concerns over racism.
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prevent such an occurrence, it was a matter of time. As anticipated, the repetition
created a different atmosphere, in the public, the Opposition and the media and
required a new strategy for the executive. Indeed, Le Monde reported that the
President considered that ‘things are different this time. What will be important
is that, this time, the response involves action, not mere symbols.’15 Such an anal-
ysis of the situation meant that the government adopted a distinct style, insisting
on the determination of the government to fight terrorism: the lexicon mobilised
included decision, demand, call, mobilisation as well as necessity and duty (‘we
must’ is repeated five times). The government’s strategy was decided after the
meetings of the Defence council and council of ministers (14 November) . From
then on the events of the previous day were qualified as ‘acts of war perpetrated
by a terrorist army’.16 During the weekend, speechwriters worked on phrases that
could resonate with the public’s emotions and reactions and define the event and
the appropriate reaction. The message, again, was simple and now well-
rehearsed: ‘this act of war perpetrated by a terrorist army that hit French people
of all ages and all colours’.17 In Versailles, ‘war’ was used five times in the first
four minutes of the President’s speech. Moreover, the government considered
that the popular mood was oriented towards confronting terrorism. Opinion re-
search conducted by the Elyse´e web team and messages received in the first few
hours were in stark contrast with the aspirations to national unity that had char-
acterised messages in January. They expressed anger and a ‘call to arms’, with
many correspondents asking to join the military and police forces. The lexicon
and the actions were selected from the existing repertoire, or invented, but the
objective was to ‘help make it happen’ and, in the speech to the Congress, the
President talked about drawing on the ‘reserve’ as a link between the army and
the Nation. The PM repeated to the Assemble´e Nationale a few days later: ‘we are
at war! (. . .) this new type of war remains a war, planned by a criminal army’ (19
November 2015). The response of France after 13 November was to be ‘merciless’
and the objective was to ‘retaliate’ and ‘eliminate’ the ‘barbarians’, to ‘destroy
Daesh’. The analysis justified implicitly the policies deployed by the government.
The government also needed to demonstrate through acts the validity of its inter-
pretations: beyond words, framing what happened as war involved symbols such
as police on the streets, house raids, legislation and military investments.
15http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/11/21/la-folle-semaine-de-l-executif_4814720_823448.
html#VKcw27KdxfS3RVZI.99, Accessed at 7 March 2016.
16The phrase is used twice in the first two sentences of the Communique´ of the Conseil de Defense, 14
November 2015.
17http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/16/comment-hollande-a-prepare-son-discours-du-congres_
1413822, Accessed 24 April 2017.
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Repetition is a rhetorical device designed to naturalise a frame, transform the
interpretation of the thus-constructed event into a ‘fact’. It is important to con-
nect the frames proposed by the government with the policies that are simulta-
neously announced as the former serves as an implicit justification for the latter.
The objective, of course, is to influence the understanding of the events (Farge,
2002, p. 67), in order to shift power relationships and prepare public opinion for
alternative futures (Bensa and Fassin, 2002, p. 10).
Having considered the rhetoric, we now turn to the efforts deployed to con-
struct national unity in January and in November and show how the government
mobilised different symbols in each case, contributing to build the events.
5. ‘L’esprit du 11 Janvier’ as national unity
We have argued in the previous section on rhetoric that, in January, the govern-
ment was particularly sensitive to the need to prevent societal fractures and politi-
cal disunity. Their strategy received considerable help at the time from willing
political and community leaders. Nevertheless, it is important to give attention to
the symbolic staging of such unity, which was produced by the executive.
Fortuitously, the leaders of religious communities were invited to the Elyse´e
Palace on a scheduled event on 7 January: the New Year ritual in France involves
the President presenting the wishes of the Republic to a diversity of social groups.
Religious leaders were invited. The meeting was maintained because, according
to the Communication advisor interviewed in June 2015, it was ‘an interesting
symbol and one of the roles of the President is to prevent social division’. The
next day, President Hollande received the Presidents of the Assemble´e Nationale,
of the Se´nat and of the Association of French Mayors. They all came out advocat-
ing a ‘Republican response’ and national unity (Boussaguet and Faucher, 2017).
In the meantime, the mobilisation of civil society was growing. There were spon-
taneous silent gatherings; the Mayor of Paris called for a march at the place de la
Re´publique on the Thursday; the left, led by the socialist party, also planned a ‘re-
publican’ march for the weekend. Surveys showed high levels of support for the
idea of a staged performance of national unity. The success of such an event de-
pended on the support of the parliamentary opposition. To alleviate his resistance
to the idea of following a socialist party initiative, the PM gave a phone call to the
Leader of the main opposition party (the former President, N. Sarkozy) in the
evening of the Charlie Hebdo attack to invite the Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire (UMP) to participate in the organisation.18 The next day, Hollande re-
ceived him at the Elyse´e with the presidential pomp and ceremony (due to his
18The former president had refused to take calls from the leader of the socialist party, considering that
it was beneath his station.
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rank as former President) to inform him of the situation, before he received the
other party leaders. Each time a political or religious leader was interviewed on
the steps of the Elyse´e, they spoke surrounded by symbols of the Republic.
As they reflected on how to pay homage to the victims and mark France’s
mourning, the executive’s teams of advisors drew from past experiences and
came up very fast with a list of rituals that were announced within hours: minutes
of silence, flags and raising the level of alert. Since the events were presented as
unique and requiring national unity, innovation seemed a logical development. A
silent march appeared as the best way to show respect for the dead that could also
avoid divisive public speeches explained Francois Lamy (Socialist MP and the of-
ficial coordinator of the march), the PM’s chef de cabinet and the Mayor’s chief
of staff. The government was drawn into the organisation at short notice of an ex-
traordinary response of the political community. The march was carefully
planned and choreographed so as to embody the unity of the country behind the
victims. From the moment the march took an international dimension, three
symbolically significant groups were organised: the victims’ families; representa-
tives of political parties, unions and civil society associations; and the executive
and the international community. Locations were carefully chosen for their prac-
ticality (whether the area could be secured) as well as their symbolic significance
(between place de la Nation and place de la Re´publique). Several moments had to
be carefully timed to ensure memorable images: the President comforting the sur-
vivors; the row of ‘VVIPs’ (very very important persons) walking 100 yards arm-
in-arm; the political and civil society leaders, side-by-side and without banners or
signs; the silent crowd; and the iconic picture of the statue place de la Re´publique
complete with demonstrators holding a giant pencil (Gu¨rsel, 2017).
Everything happened very quickly: on the Friday evening, the President de-
clared: ‘I call on all French women and men to rise up on Sunday, together, to
carry the values of democracy, freedom, pluralism to which we are all attached
and that Europe represents’ (Hollande, 9 January). Such a call was unprece-
dented.19 It can be read as an instance of the government’s efforts to construct
the unity of the nation while riding the tide of public opinion: as an Elyse´e official
told us, the march ‘only worked because the French people had decided to rise’.
In a striking illustration of performative speech, the Interior Minister (and other
officials) announced security measures that would allow the ‘historic’ and un-
precedented demonstration. They also decided not to give official figures, thereby
contributing to a rare consensus on the number of ‘demonstrators’.
Within the space of a week, the government helped coordinate the largest
demonstration in Paris since 1944, an international summit and a touching
19Mitterrand marched in protest against anti-Semitic acts in 1990 (Boussaguet and Faucher, 2017).
The large gaullist rally of 30 May 1968 was more discretely organised (Georgi, 1995).
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ceremony at the Prefecture (Boussaguet and Faucher, 2017). It mobilised its pub-
lic relations expertise and resources to focus media and public attention on the
President’s effective and relentless handling of the crisis at a national as well as an
international level. It benefited from the fact that all broadcasters had switched to
a ‘breaking news’ format and were therefore eager to cover governmental com-
munication and fill their airtime with images, interviews and live reports. The
ballet of visitors to the Elyse´e Palace provided a useful focus for attention and an
opportunity to frame national and political unity. It had been agreed that the
march would be silent (to avoid the expression of any dissenting interpretation
and politicisation) and without signs (to prevent antagonising sections of the
public with offensive cartoons drawn from Charlie Hebdo). Marchers filled the
void with symbols: flags and pencils, clapping and Marseillaise, a multitude of
pictures of themselves in the crowd.
For several days, the media had no critical comment to make and even the
Front National (FN) found itself in a tricky situation. Effectively, the government
made the 11 January itself a secular ritual (Moore and Myerhoff, 1977). It was
organised to enact public expectations but was also expected to help alter public
perceptions of social fragmentation through ‘imagable unity’(Gu¨rsel, 2017, p.
138). Staging unity effectively created for a while the appearance of consensus
(Baudot, 2015) and the week-long crisis ended with the PM receiving a standing
ovation and MPs singing the Marseillaise after his speech to the Assemble´e
Nationale (13 January). This was a unique display of political unity at the end of
a week rich in public rituals honouring the Republic, its values and its heroes. It
highlighted the importance of the republican liturgy in France.
Such an impeccable demonstration of political unity and rallying around the
Republic was, we have showed, carefully constructed. Other factors than a patri-
otic effect and political leadership contribute to explain why the Opposition fol-
lowed the Government. With departmental elections three months away,
political competition could be temporarily bracketed to confront an attack that
was defined as targeting the Republic, the State and the Nation. The impression
of unity and republicanism was maintained despite debates around the participa-
tion of the FN and whether this party could count as a republican political orga-
nisation. Indeed, since the 1980s, electoral coalitions designed to prevent the FN
from winning seats have been called ‘front re´publicain’. Despite the support of
public opinion for an inclusive march, parties were reluctant to normalise their
opponent. The official organiser of the March, the socialist MP Lamy, had per-
sonally taken a clear position against the participation of the FN. The extreme left
had also done so but the parliamentary right was reluctant to do so publicly. The
President adopted an ambiguous position, offering Marine Le Pen special police
protection during the Parisian march. Eventually, Le Pen self-excluded. She re-
solved the potential embarrassment by marching outside of Paris and denouncing
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the strange national unity that excluded the opposition party leading in the polls.
Yet, the pressure to rally was such that even the FN praised the ‘oecumenical role’
played by Hollande during the first week, as a close advisor of M. Le Pen told us.
Despite the expected erosion on public opinion enthusiasm, new legislation on
intelligence was adopted with wide support by both houses a few months later.
The ambiguities carried by the government’s staging of national unity were not
lost on the right and the extreme right. This largely explains the resistance en-
countered a few months later.
6. Rallying around the ﬂag in November
Paradoxically, to demonstrate that a response is not only ‘symbolic’ (i.e. without
effect) requires an emphasis on the performance and on the language used. In fact,
the policy initiatives may be presented as deeds not words but, as we have seen,
performance is a symbolic social practice. In November, the government drew
once again from the traditional symbolic repertoire: a national day of mourning,
flags at half mast, a minute of silence, ceremonies, democratic institutions, mobili-
sation of the State apparatus and of the President himself as Head of State, Garde
Re´publicaine, views of the Elyse´e Palace, visibility of the military personnel, etc.
Policies were symbolic in that they were developed through symbolic institutions,
such as the Congress, or through the reassertion of the monopoly of violence.
The President repeated some of the performances that had worked so well in
January to consolidate or demonstrate political unity. He received political lead-
ers one after the other at the Elyse´e on 15 November. Despite this staging, it
quickly appeared in November that the response from the right-wing opposition
was less enthusiastic. On their way out, and on the very steps of the Elyse´e Palace,
Sarkozy and Le Pen complained that the government had failed to protect France
because it had not acted on the demands they had articulated in January.
The Congress was convened, following the suggestion of the PM, on the
Monday 16 November. It was supposed to mark a symbolic crescendo from
January’s dual speeches and to provide the setting for the display of political unity
(Boussaguet and Faucher, 2017). The President made a series of announcements
at the Congress to demonstrate that he had listened to his interlocutors and was
taking on board some of their proposals: the state of emergency had been de-
clared, a number of private homes had been searched and home arrests pro-
nounced; the Interior Minister would ‘as soon as tomorrow call on his EU
counterparts and invoke article 42-7 of the Treaty to require support at a time of
aggression, because this enemy is not the enemy of France but the enemy of
Europe’ (16 November). Budgetary commitments were made to increase the
number of recruits in the police and the army, in the judiciary and in border con-
trols, to ensure further investments in security and intelligence means, to allow
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the tracking of weapons trafficking. The President promised advocating a
Europe-wide air passenger database. He insisted: ‘I consider that the security pact
trumps the stability pact.’ Naming the attacks as ‘acts of war’ justifies the use of
military force. Words were accompanied by action: the President announced he
had ordered the bombing of Raqqa (the stronghold of the organisation ISIS that
had claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks) on 15 November. He confirmed
that the deployment of police and military personnel in the streets would last.
This is an interesting example of the performance of the exercise of the powers of
the State. The presence of armed representatives of the State on the streets and
metro stations is a deterrent to potential amateur terrorists but uniforms and mil-
itary gear is also reassuring for a fraction of the population.
These initiatives could have been expected. On the other hand, the decision to
reform the Constitution took everybody by surprise. It was yet another important
symbolic gesture, signalling how important the President considered the need to
reinforce the government’s ability to act in response to terrorism and to do so
within the frame of the rule of law (state of emergency). It also included a serious
concession to the right and the extreme right: the destitution of French citizenship
for bi-nationals convicted of terrorism. Indeed, this very suggestion had been pre-
viously rejected by the actors now in government. The reform was not expected to
have any effect on terrorism,20 but was responding to concerns around the defini-
tion of French identity and the redrawing of symbolic boundaries. The PM argued
that ‘the State could take measures that would be both symbolic and concrete’21
and also that ‘when one is in France, symbols are important’.22
The first criticisms of the government were publicly voiced within minutes
and on Twitter by the FN and meetings with parliamentary party leaders had con-
vinced the President that for the congress to be a successful show of unity, no de-
bate could be allowed. He rejected the request for a debate after his address to the
Congress, but the government could not prevent the raucous session of the
Assemble´e Nationale the following day. Outraged reactions from the public, and
a caucus meeting of Les Re´publicains, brought discipline back on the benches of
the Assemble´e Nationale.
20The bill that was submitted for advice to the Conseil d’Etat (CE) and the media speculated that the
government was hoping that the CE would reject the proposition. The government would thus have
been able to claim that it was open to suggestions since it had taken up the opposition’s idea. CE, ‘Avis
sur le projet de loi constitutionnelle’ www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/projets/pl3381-ace.pdf,
Accessed at10 March 16.
21PM Valls interviewed on France Inter on 11 December 2015, http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-le-
79-manuel-valls-le-programme-du-fn-cest-la-division, Accessed at 10 March 16. See also Le Monde
(23 December 2015).
22‘On n’est pas couche´’, France 2, 16 January 2016.
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Why was the right particularly wary of granting its support to the government?
Politics does not evaporate at times of crisis, even when it is paramount to appear
patriotic and non-partisan. The first regional elections within the new legislative
framework were three weeks away and the Opposition feared the political trap-
pings of unconditional support. Polls on voting intentions indicated that the FN
was the main beneficiary of the year’s crises (terrorism, Greece, migrants, Syria)
and was likely to win for the first time in three of them (Faucher and Garcia,
2016). There was a cost in leaving too much space for security concerns to be
dominated by the FN: backbenchers and candidates on regional lists joined an
initially timid but growing chorus of critics. On the other hand, there is a cost in
appearing disloyal (Baum and Groeling 2009), which the right-wing elites (partic-
ularly the would-be candidates in the 2016 right-wing presidential primary) were
not prepared to take. Opposition leaders talked about ‘solidarity with the govern-
ment’ rather than ‘national unity’ and asked for concessions. Parliamentarians
demanded that home searches be more visible and house arrests longer, that off-
duty police officers be allowed to carry their weapons, the hardening of security
and military response. Keen to show good will and meet the Opposition half way
in order to secure its ‘support’, the Government took on board a number of these
policies. The state of emergency was nearly unanimously adopted for 3 months
(six votes against in the Assemble´e Nationale).
The state of emergency outlawed demonstrations and the popular mood was
more prone to panic movements enhanced by the fear of other incidents. The
momentum of January was also impossible to reproduce, so the government
organised a civil ceremony 2 weeks after the attacks (27 November). Normally
used for military ceremonies and to honour national heroes, Les Invalides offered
a symbolically significant setting as well as a closed and easily secured space.
During the ceremony, the President stood alone to listen to the litany of 130
names. The conception of the ceremony drew from lessons learnt in January. The
symbols of national unity that had emerged then were incorporated. The
Marseillaise was played and two popular songs were sung by four women chosen
to represent French diversity and culture. The November ceremony was compar-
atively a modest media event (Katz and Dayan, 1994) and no public event. The
public unfortunately could not participate in the ceremony. In a highly unusual
move in the French political context, the President told the Council of Ministers:
‘every French person could also participate by adorning the front of their resi-
dence with French colours, a blue white red flag’.23 Tricolours had been trending
on Facebook and other social media, and the literal rally around the flag was
23Compte rendu du Conseil des Ministres, 25 November 2015. On the use of the French flag in con-
temporary French politics, see Vincent Martigny (2016) “Que nous dit le drapeau sur l’identite´ fran-
aise, 2012-16”, Conference Symbopolitique, LIEPP, Sciences Po, 22 January 2016.
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widely commented in the press.24 The Service d’Information du Gouvernement
relayed the call with two other suggestions (selfies with three colours and posting
on Twitter or social networks25), thereby offering a symbolic toolbox to willing
citizens, like flags to download on the official websites. Although flags were dis-
played, the government did not succeed in recreating the momentum of 11
January26 and the injunction to use symbols was a poor replacement for partici-
pation in a secular ritual.
7. Conclusion
In January and in November 2015, France was confronted with two series of ma-
jor coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris (a number of incidents and failed attacks
were also recorded during the year). The events shocked France (and the world)
and gave rise to a plurality of interpretations, transforming collective representa-
tions. A number of actors were involved in these processes. While the literature
has looked at phenomenon of a rallying around the flag as a patriotic reflex
(Mueller, 1985) and considered the conditions under which public opinion
(Hetherington and Nelson, 2003; Collins, 2004), the Opposition (Chowanietz,
2016) or the media (Kuypers, 2006) are likely to support the government, our
analysis is unique in that it provides insight about the political and symbolic
work necessary to make such reactions possible. The strategies developed in both
instances are good examples of how contemporary politics mobilises the sym-
bolic, a dimension of public policy that is often neglected. We have argued that
the French government mobilised symbols and symbolic practices to provide key
narratives of France’s resilience. We have shown how it framed the crises and
their resolution as moments in which it acted decisively and united the Nation.
The government interpreted what had happened and presented itself as retaking
control of the monopoly of violence. At the same time, we show that the repeti-
tion of incidents weakened the position of the government, as they had
anticipated.
The French government was quite successful in creating an impression of con-
sensus in January to the extent that ‘l’esprit du 11 Janvier’ (Valls, 13/11) remains
one of the key interpretations of what happened in January 2015. In the months
that followed, it engaged in a learning process and became more acutely aware of
the importance of symbolic politics: some of the mistakes of January were not
reproduced in November. Innovations were necessary, they were not always
24For instance: ‘Plane`te Bleu Blanc Rouge’, Le Monde (21 November 15).
25http://www.gouvernement.fr/partagez-hommage-national, Accessed at 13 March 2016.
26Parodic uses were also noted, including adorning windows with three-coloured pieces of clothing.
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successful. If anything, the use of political symbols is never straightforward be-
cause each attack takes place in an ever-changing context. This is not surprising if
we consider how symbols condense a variety of meanings that affect differently
different categories of the population. Moreover, the context brings specific con-
straints on the ability to mobilise symbols effectively, and on the appropriateness
of some symbols according to circumstances and the public mood.
Further research needs to investigate how political elites and their entourage
understand and manipulate political symbols, and to what extent these symbolic
actions contribute to restore order after a crisis. In November, the government
successfully managed the initial phases of the crisis but failed to reach a definitive
closure (Boin et al., 2011). In particular, it failed to bring to a conclusion the proj-
ected reform of the constitution, which was abandoned in May 2016 in the face
of divisions within the Left. The executive was thus symbolically weakened when
more terrorist attacks were perpetrated on the French Riviera in July 2016. Then,
national unity lasted but a few hours: locally, the Opposition reacted quickly and
aggressively, blaming the government for the failure to prevent terrorism; the
government was literally booed in Nice and struggled for weeks to appease the de-
bate. This contrasted with the two other attacks perpetrated in June and July. The
comparison between January and November 2015 offered a first overview, which
needs to be deepened thanks to the comparison with the Nice case in July 2016 in
France and also with attacks in other national contexts, like Brussels in March
2016 or more recently London and Manchester (March, May and June 2017).
This would contribute to a theory of political symbols and how they are mobi-
lised by political actors.
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